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INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper argues that a security community remains an object 
rather than a reality among the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries. This notwithstanding, ASEAN 
institutions, processes and structures in the security regime have 
multiplied manifold over its 38 years of existence. Theoretical work 
on ASEAN suggests that a realist-institutional understanding of 
ASEAN should now be supplanted by what could be called "state-
centric constructivism". However, the paper argues that such a 
theoretical development fails to fully account for the political 
construction of a security community based on some measure of 
civil society engagement albeit in the highly state-driven ASEAN 
formation. It is the understanding of this writer that the agency for 
change emanating from civil society forces still remains generally 
under-theorised.  
The evolution of literature on ASEAN seems to bear a strong 
correspondence with the shifting discourse on security and 
regionalization in Southeast Asia. Early work in ASEAN was 
dominated by the realist school of thought but by the 1980s and 
1990s, neo-functional and institutional approaches to ASEAN 
began to gain much discursive ground. There is now also some 
work which uses the discourse and language of conflict resolution 
and peace research. Such a shift has come along with a 
constructivist and more reflexivist approach to understanding 
ASEAN.   
The paper suggests that the embedded diplomatic and 
security culture of the "ASEAN way" is increasingly becoming 
counter-productive to the construction of a genuine security 
community. It examines how state-civil society engagement in the 
area of human rights, clearly an important aspect in the quest for 
a security community, remains largely on a national or domestic 
level (if at all in some states) rather than on an regional plane. 
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Despite many ASEAN countries' acceptance and adherence to 
various human rights conventions and the emergence of several 
national human rights commissions, the ASEAN approach to 
human rights remains hesitant and non-commital. This is due 
largely to ASEAN consensual decision-making targeted at the 
lowest common denominator and its principle of on-interference in 
internal affairs of member-states. However, the appearance of a 
Working Group on an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism and a 
civil-society-driven NGO such as ALTSEAN does augur well for 
continuing and further engagement of civil forces with the ASEAN 
formation. Such engagement could help to deepen processes and 
structures for human security in ASEAN. 
 
 
ASEAN SECURITY DISCOURSE – THE RELEVANCE OF STATE-
CIVIL SOCIETY DYNAMICS 
 
The literature on ASEAN security has become rather voluminous 
but recent writings have clearly witnessed a shift from rationalist–
realist, institutional and transactional approaches to those that 
broadly come under the rubric of "constructivism" or are 
influenced by the constructive turn in international relations 
theory propounded by Alexander Wendt. He states his theory of 
constructivism plainly as making the following claims: 
 
1. States are the principal units of analysis for international 
political theory; 
 
2. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, 
rather than material; and 
 
3. State identities and interests are in important part 
constructed by these social structures rather than given 
exogenously by the system by human nature or domestic 
politics (Wendt, 1994: 385). 
 
Wendt seems to have inspired a spate of more critical 
ASEAN studies which put the accent on the relationships between 
ideas, identities and interests through the agency of the generic 
"ASEAN state". In applying Wendtian theorising, it could be argued 
that an ASEAN "pluralistic security community" has resulted 
through statist construction rather that through the older notion 
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of transactional flows propounded by Karl Deutsch and others. In 
the language of Wendtian constructivism these relationships have 
evolved along with socially and politically constructed structures 
which are not exogenous givens of the anarchical international 
order. The developments are themselves constituted by the social 
actors within particular social groupings and contexts with their 
particular notions, identities and interests. In this brief literature 
review, let me take a few recent examples of constructivist or 
constructivist-inspired writings on ASEAN and then relate this to 
the state of security discourse and practice in ASEAN. In the 
process, I will also develop my own understanding of construc-
tivism as it appertains to ASEAN. 
The work of Acharya (1999, 2001) seems to bear the strong 
influence of constructivism. The latter work cited above which is 
titled Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia clearly 
bears the hallmark of constructivist theorizing. Thus, the book 
examines the interplay between norms and socialization, such as 
the "ASEAN way" as well as the regulatory and constitutive effects 
of ASEAN, its various self-generated processes and institutions, in 
its quest to become security community. In my view, the flavour 
and thrust of Acharya's enlightening work falls largely within the 
broad sphere of state-centric constructivism, more or less in 
keeping with Wendtian theory.   
Another author, Jürgen Rüland, in a self-consciously 
critical engagement with the constructivist literature examines the 
Asian crisis of 1997/1998 and its implications for ASEAN's brand 
of regionalism. He suggests that at the end of the day, "ASEAN's 
policy mix is closer to the realist than institutionalist pole." 
(Ruland, 2000: 443). He further argues that the "institutional and 
constructivist requiems for realism were premature", looking at 
ASEAN's handling of the financial crisis. Yet another work on 
ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture (Haacke, 2003) falls 
squarely within a state-centric paradigm while adopting only some 
of the language of constructivism. The author suggests that the 
core of the ASEAN security culture, known famously as the 
"ASEAN way" can be decomposed into the following elements, 
namely: 
 
• Sovereign equality 
• Non-recourse to the use of force 
• Non-interference and non-intervention 
• Non-involvement of ASEAN in bilateral conflict 
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• Quiet diplomacy 
• Mutual respect and tolerance  
 
Haacke's argument that such a culture was the basis of all 
of ASEAN cooperative ventures begs the important question of how 
such a culture has provided the constructivist tenets for success 
or effectiveness of the regional body, or indeed, whether such a 
culture is even an impediment to the attainment of a full-fledged 
security community. 
My own work on ASEAN (Saravanamuttu, 1999) has tried to 
steer analysis away from a state-centric paradigm and falls under 
another rubric of constructivism. Taking the cue from Falk's 
notion of "geo-governance" (Falk, 1995), I have argued that in 
ASEAN and Asia-Pacific regionalism, there emerged a plethora of 
competing visions and missions stemming from state and non-
state actors. ASEAN security processes and agendas have however 
remained profoundly state-centric. Quite often the non-state 
visions with their "alternative" discourses were mirror images of 
their state counterparts with paradigms verging on a total 
rejection of the statist visions for regional order (Saravanamuttu, 
1999: 108). The essay ends with a call for a dialogic interaction 
between civil society and state to fashion more non-violent, 
humane approaches to geo-governance. 
What then could be the relevance of state-civil engagement 
for the development of security discourse in ASEAN in a 
constructivist vein?  William Tow's essay on "Alternative Security 
Models: Implications for ASEAN" (2003) provides some fruitful 
answers. Tow avers that "constructivism invites policy-makers and 
analysts alike to delve beneath perceived (or misperceived) interest 
and intentions of potential opponents."  Positing that the "human 
security model" poses the most significant challenge to traditional 
security referents he states: 
 
Ultimately, security is about all of us and each of us, 
regardless of how we may choose to organize institutions or 
instruments at a given time to achieve it. This model 
supplants the collective human rights concept. (Tow, 2003: 
304) 
 
He further calls for a linking of traditional and alternative 
security perspectives and agendas. Taking the area of conflict 
prevention as an example, he suggests that time-honoured 
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strategies to achieve regional stability could converge with the 
attempts of alternative security proponents "to discern and 
eradicate the root causes of conflict, based on economic 
deprivation, social cleavages and human suffering". (Ibid: 308). If I 
could further extrapolate from Tow's essay, the agency for such a 
convergence would be the engagement with the state of civil forces, 
groups and NGOs whose work is indeed focused on issues and 
questions of human security. State-civil society dynamics could 
therefore be seen as an important plank for new constructions of 
regional security agendas which are in greater sync with societal 
concerns and problems.  
We will now turn to look at the engagement of civil society 
elements in the human rights issue-area of ASEAN. While Tow 
may be correct to suggest that human security encompasses 
human rights and it may be germane nonetheless to examine in 
some detail the agency of the "ASEAN state" and non-state actors 
working in a specific security issue-area in order to derive some 
practical and theoretical outcomes. 
 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM 
 
ASEAN's track record on human rights as a regional body and in 
terms of individual member countries has been less than stellar. 
No ASEAN country has ratified all the main international 
instruments of human rights and only two countries, the 
Philippines and Cambodia, have ratified the six major conventions. 
Cambodia alone has ratified all human rights related conventions 
(see Table 1). Brunei has only ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) which therefore sees unanimous ASEAN 
approval while only three countries, Cambodia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, have ratified the Convention against Torture (CAT).1  
In the 1993 Vienna UN Conference on Human Rights, the 
ASEAN states adopted a united stand based on the Bangkok 
Governmental Human Rights Declaration, 1993. ASEAN is 
evidently not comfortable with the emphasis on the universality of 
human rights and the emphasis on civil and political rights over 
development and basic needs. This could have spurred the idea of 
promoting a regional rather than a global regime for human rights. 
                                                 
1  For a more extensive discussion the prospect for a human rights legal regime to 
cohere in ASEAN, see Maznah Mohamad, 2002: especially, pp. 232–236. 
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Thus at the ASEAN 26th Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in that 
same year, ASEAN governments along with their parliamentarians 
(AIPO) who were meeting in Kuala Lumpur, declared the 
willingness to set up regional human rights mechanism (Medina, 
1999).  
 Starting in 1995, the LAWASIA (Law Association for Asia 
and the Pacific) Human Rights Standing Committee organized a 
series of meetings among representatives of national human rights 
institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, and human 
rights NGOs in the region to discuss proposals for a human rights 
mechanism in Southeast Asia. The meetings eventually led to the 
formation of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism in 1996.2 
 
TABLE 1 
ASEAN COUNTRIES RATIFYING MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONVENTIONS AND COVENANTS (2003) 
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ICERD (International 
Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination)       
1965  
Υ Υ Υ   Υ   Υ 
ICCPR (International 
Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights)                 
1966  
Υ  Υ   Υ  Υ Υ 
ICESCR (International 
Covenant on Economic,  
Social and Cultural 
Rights)  
1966  
Υ  Υ   Υ  Υ Υ 
(continued on next page) 
                                                 
2 Organizations providing support for the initiatives were the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation, the Asia Foundation and the Southeast Asia Fund for Institutional 
and Legal Development (SEAFILD) of the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). 
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TABLE 1 – (Continued)  
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CEDAW (Convention on 
the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women)                
1979  
Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ 
CAT (Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment)              
1984 
 Υ Υ    Υ    
CRC (Convention on the 
Rights of the Child)            
1989 
Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ 
 
Other Conventions 
Freedom of Association 
and  Collective 
Bargaining               
1948  
Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the 
Right to Organize 
Convention (87)  
 
Υ 
 
Υ   
 
Υ 
 
Υ  
  
 
Freedom of Association 
and                    
Collective Bargaining        
1949                                
Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining 
Convention (98)  
 
Υ 
 
Υ  
 
Υ  
 
Υ 
 
Υ 
  
(continued on next page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
IJAPS Vol. 1 2005 (Inaugural Issue) Wither the ASEAN Security Community?  
TABLE 1 – (Continued)  
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El   Compulsory Labour 
1930                                 
Forced Labour Convention 
(29)  
 
Υ 
 
Υ 
 
Υ 
 
Υ 
 
Υ  
 
Υ 
 
Υ  
Elimination of Forced        
and Compulsory Labour    
1957                                
Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention (105)  
 
Υ 
 
Υ  
 
X  
 
Υ 
 
X 
 
Υ  
Elimination of Discrimi-
nation in Employment 
and Occupation      
1951                    
Equal Remuneration 
Convention (100)  
 
Υ 
 
Υ  
 
Υ  
 
Υ  
 
X 
 
Υ 
Elimination of Discrimi-
nation in Employment 
and Occupation     
1958 
Discrimination 
(Employment and 
Occupation) Convention 
(111)  
Υ Υ    Υ   Υ 
Abolition of Child Labour   
1973 
Minimum Age Convention 
(138) 
 Υ Υ  Υ  Υ    
Abolition of Child Labour   
1999 
Worst forms of Child 
Labour Convention (182) 
 Υ Υ  Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ Υ 
 
Υ = Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance or 
definitive signature 
X =  Ratification denounced 
 
Source: Human Development Report 2003 (2003). 
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The Working Group is composed of human rights advocates 
from government institutions and NGOs who represent their 
respective national working groups. National working groups have 
been set up in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
with the aim of eventually having national working groups in each 
ASEAN state consisting of representatives of the government, 
parliamentary human rights committees, the academe, and NGOs. 
The Working Group has met with ASEAN foreign ministers 
in 1996 (Jakarta), and with senior officials in 1997 (Kuala 
Lumpur), in 1998 (Manila) and in 1999 (Singapore) on the 
proposal for an ASEAN human rights mechanism. National 
working groups have undertaken related activities within their 
respective countries. 
According to the Working Group's Secretary-General, Carlos 
P. Medena, ASEAN's response to the initiative has been 
encouraging. In its Joint Communiqué of the occasion of the       
31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 25 July 1998 in Manila ASEAN 
states that: 
 
The Foreign Ministers recalled the decision of the 26th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting held on 23–24 July 1993 in Singapore to 
consider the establishment of an appropriate mechanism on 
human rights and noted the establishment of the informal 
non-governmental Working Group for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism. The Foreign Ministers noted further the 
dialogues held between the Working Group and ASEAN 
officials in Jakarta during the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
and in Kuala Lumpur during the 30th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting. They recognized the importance of continuing these 
dialogues and took note of the proposals made by the 
Working Group during its dialogue with ASEAN held in 
Manila on 22 July 1998. 
 
Likewise, in the Joint Communiqué of the 32nd ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, ASEAN once more recognized the 
need for continuous dialogues concerning the formation of a 
human rights mechanism in ASEAN: 
 
We recalled the decision of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting held on 23–24 July 1993 in Singapore to consider 
the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on 
human rights and noted the establishment of the informal 
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non-governmental Working Group and ASEAN officials have 
met regularly since the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
Jakarta, most recently in Singapore. We recognized the 
importance of continuing these dialogues. (Medina, 1999) 
 
There have also been meetings among the ASEAN 
Governments, national human rights commissions and the 
Working Group, the first held in Jakarta in 2001, the second in 
Manila in 2002 and third in Bangkok in 2003. In the third 
workshop, a "Roadmap for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism" 
was proposed by Vitit Mantarbhorn, which encouraged the 
establishment of working groups between representatives of the 
governments, national human rights institutions and civil society 
and the establishment of the Eminent Persons Group whose work 
is to provide comments or information for the Working Group.  
There was also an ASEAN-ISIS colloquium on Human Rights held 
in February 2002 in which the "ASEAN Human Rights Scorecard" 
would be linked to the Southeast Asian Human Development 
Report for United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This 
is still ongoing at the time of writing.  
In his concluding remarks at the 3rd Workshop on the 
ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, Bangkok, 27–29 
May 2003. Saneh Chamarik, chair of Thailand's National Human 
Rights Commission made the following interesting remarks: 
 
To get the ball rolling, the national human rights 
commissions, academic communities, and civil society groups 
are to be mobilized into networking. Mind you, this is not just 
for the purpose of facilitating contacts or exchange of ideas 
and experiences for their own sake, but for real, concrete and 
relevant action. One would rather not to go into lists of 
activities involved here. But, to serve as the basis for human 
rights capacity building, a certain common groundwork could 
very well be looked into here, taking into account the 
perceived common needs of the Southeast Asian peoples. 
(Chamarik, 2003). 
 
As can be gathered from this brief narrative of the activities 
of the ASEAN Working Group on Human Rights, while it appears 
that the group is progressing well with its work, in point of fact, 
not much have been actually achieved by way of concrete results. 
By and large, the group has acted so far only as the "human rights 
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conscience" of ASEAN (Maznah, 2002: 237). Much of the actual 
work and engagement of civil forces with the ASEAN on human 
rights is conducted at the national rather than at the regional level 
through the mechanism of national human rights commissions. 
 
 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS3  
 
In ASEAN today, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand have established their own National Human Rights 
Commissions (NHRCs). NHRCs are in theory responsible for 
maintaining human rights standards but enforcement is 
ultimately the responsibility of national states. The principles used 
to guide and establish national human rights institutions are 
known as the "Paris Principles". The Paris Principles include the 
notion of a comprehensive mandate to deal with any violation of 
human rights including those specified in international 
conventions not ratified by national governments, having a 
membership composition that is independent from a broad 
spectrum of civil society, and the assurance that national 
commissions function without government interference. 
 
Philippine Commission on Human Rights 
 
In the Philippines, as is to be expected from its longer history, the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) has become deeply 
embedded in both the operation of government and society, having 
developed far-reaching networks through years of active 
coordination and cooperation on different projects. In addition to 
extensive cooperation and coordination with civil society and 
government, the CHR has also established a wide ranging regional 
network of subsidiary organizations, including regional offices and 
a system of local Barangay Human Rights Action Centres to 
extend its presence down to every village.  However this ambitious 
plan is plagued by a lack of resources, as there is no budget to 
support the centres, and the CHR is either unable or unwilling to 
supervise these bodies effectively. Out of 40,000 villages, so far 
only 14,000 have established these Human Rights Action Centres.   
 
                                                 
3 This discussion of the work of the national human rights commissions is 
derived from Maznah Mohamad (2002: 237–245).  
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Indonesia's Komnas HAM 
 
One of the biggest reasons for the early successes of Indonesia's 
Komnas HAM, was ironically, Suharto's strong centralized control 
and his endorsement of the institution. This had allowed for the 
smooth coordination among government agencies to the advantage 
of Komnas HAM.  However, the range of investigation that the 
commission could undertake was severely constrained by that 
same power.  Now the situation is completely reversed, as political 
liberalization has greatly expanded the range of options open, 
while the fragmentation of power, lack of coordination and 
institutional decay (corruption) has seriously constrained the 
effectiveness of all government institutions, including Komnas 
HAM. While some civil and political rights have improved for 
many, some of the most basic rights - to life, freedom from fear, to 
a home – are more tenuous than ever for countless others. Indeed, 
calls have recently been made by a coalition of prominent NGOs 
for the entire Komnas HAM commission to resign en masse for 
their failure to deal with some of the worst atrocities of the 
Suharto era and the transitional period after he stepped down.  
The limited prosecution of past human rights violations 
remains one of the biggest failures of the post-Suharto era.  
President Megawati's own commitment to human rights remains 
uncertain.  While she recently endorsed the need to settle gross 
violations of human rights in regions of armed conflict and allowed 
the prosecution of offences in East Timor she is close to a number 
of prominent military figures. Up until 2001, only 19 of 33 East 
Timor rights violators identified by Komnas HAM have been 
accepted by the Attorney General's Office as "candidate suspects".  
Furthermore, despite the setting up of the Human Rights court in 
January 2002 to try at least 18 army leaders and militiamen, 
there has been criticism at the decision by the attorney-general's 
office not to prosecute the then defense minister and armed forces 
chief General Wiranto, alleged by human rights groups to be 
morally responsible for the violence. 
  
Malaysia's SUHAKAM 
 
Malaysia's situation is different from that of the Philippines and 
Indonesia.  One might expect that the National Human Rights 
Commission SUHAKAM could also benefit from the efficiencies of 
authoritarian rule as Komnas HAM did in Indonesia in the mid-
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1990s.  However, SUHAKAM was created at a time of political 
ferment in Malaysia, when the government was actively repressing 
its political opposition while putting former deputy premier Anwar 
Ibrahim on trial for suspect charges.  In this context, it was 
difficult for the commission to ignore all of the government's 
controversial actions, and thus it found itself quite vocally 
criticizing the latter.   
Despite initial fears that SUHAKAM would be nothing more 
than window dressing to restore the credibility of the government 
while it dealt with Anwar, some NGO activists have acknowledged 
that the commission has done a commendable job given its 
difficult circumstances.  However, the very issue of Anwar's trial, 
and the detentions of other dissidents brings out an important 
point in the Commission's powers – it cannot address or 
investigate any issue which is, or has been before the courts. The 
commission has had some modest success in putting out frank 
reports critical of the government's use of the ISA, limitations on 
freedom of speech and most recently freedom of assembly.  
SUHAKAM's recommendations following its first open 
inquiry into allegations of police brutality in a massive 5 November 
2001 protest rally along the Kesas highway have been welcomed 
by the public but met with government stonewalling and 
condemnation of the report as being influenced by 'western 
thinking' and not in the interest of the nation. But one of the 
commissioners reported that such an action had helped change 
the attitudes of law enforcers, as some policemen are now 
conscious of SUHAKAM's possible rebuke if complaints from the 
public, no matter how trivial are not recorded down. However, the 
fallout of September has seen the commission retreating from its 
own purpose. Soon after September 11, the then chairman of the 
commission, Musa Hitam uttered the unfortunate statement that 
in light of the fight against terrorism, "human rights must take a 
backseat". 
 
Thailand's National Human Rights Commission 
 
Thailand's National Commission was slow in getting started, 
taking nearly four years from the 1997 constitutional mandate to 
the opening of their offices in 2001.  This was due to the fierce 
debate over the enabling laws necessary to establish the 
commission. Academics, business people and civil society activists 
aligned against conservative politicians and bureaucrats over the 
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exact character of the body.  The independence of the commission 
became a central issue, as conservatives sought to make it an 
easily controlled, minor bureaucratic office in contrast to the 
activists' vision of an independent, vocal and effective body. Using 
the media as their platform and threatening to blacklist politicians 
supporting conservative proposals in an upcoming election, the 
activists were successful in forcing a compromise, making it 
possible for an enabling bill to be passed, with the commission 
coming under the Senate for its first five years, and then have the 
option to become independent. 
The complex procedure used for selecting National 
Commissioners, which sought to build a broad-based social 
consensus involving all sectors of society directly concerned with 
the promotion and protection of human rights, delayed the start-
up date of the commission. Commissioner Saneh Chamarik 
advocates a local definition of rights, with strong emphasis on the 
protection of traditional "way of life" as communities seek to regain 
some degree of autonomy after decades of rigid centralization. 
Others argue for the use of international standards, in turn 
criticized by nationalists resentful of foreign domination. The 
Office of the National Commission and its staff are considered "an 
agency of the National Assembly", leaving control over hiring and 
funding in the hands of professional politicians, many of whom 
still operate according to more traditional clientelist patterns. 
Within the context of Thailand's rapidly changing political 
landscape, it remains to be seen what impact such constraints will 
have.   
Maznah Mohamad observes: 
 
Clearly, a human rights culture is not inimical to the realities 
of local conditions. The biggest stumbling block remains the 
nature of the modern nation-state itself. Human rights 
mechanisms enhanced by international instruments are 
persistently seen as a threat to national sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the identity of Southeast Asian nation-states is 
crafted upon its ability to deliver economic welfare which is 
in turn peddled by the state as predicated upon the 
preponderance of public security and order. Thus, while the 
battle for the promotion of human rights may win the 
approval of the public, the war against the tyranny of the 
nation-state has yet to be won by the proponents of a 
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universal normative cause such as that of human rights. 
(Ibid: 247). 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE ENGAGEMENT: THE CASE OF ALTSEAN–
BURMA 
 
The Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN) was set up 
on 30 October 1996 at the conclusion of the Alternative ASEAN 
meeting on Burma at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.  The 
meeting attracted some 90 participants from 46 organizations in 
20 countries. At this inaugural meeting, a "peoples' reclamation of 
ASEAN" was declared and the Alternative Declaration on Burma 
was adopted. By 1997, this declaration has been endorsed by 
some 200 organizations and key individuals in Southeast Asia. 
The objectives and work of ALTSEAN include the following: 
 
• Initiate and implement a range of activities to support 
human rights, democracy and peace in Burma, and 
ultimately, in the rest of Southeast Asia. 
 
• Campaign work to pressure member states of ASEAN and 
the ASEAN Regional Forum to facilitate positive reforms in 
Burma in the direction of a restoration of democracy, 
cessation of human rights violations, including an end to 
the oppression of Burma's ethnic minorities. 
 
• Advocacy for the Burma cause at local, national, regional 
and international levels though information dissemination, 
workshop and other means. 
 
• Internship programme aimed at increasing interaction and 
understanding among activists from Burma and ASEAN 
member states. 
 
• Producing resources in the form of books, videos, reports, 
posters, t-shirts and the like for the Burma cause. 
 
The structure of ALTSEAN is that of a network of 
organizations that is open to participation from a wide range of 
NGOs and individuals. It is managed by a Steering Committee 
made up of representatives from Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand which meets once in six months. A 
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smaller Executive Team located at Bangkok meets monthly. 
Among the interesting resources produced by ALTSEAN is the 
"Report Card" of April 1999 carrying a message from Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi to the 55th Session of UN Commission of Human 
Rights. The particular Report Card also contains succinct 
assessments on international relations, the human rights 
situation, relations with religious and ethic groups, relations with 
the democracy movement, drugs and HIV/AIDS, situation of 
refugees, health and safety for women, education and economy.4   
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is clear from the paper that in ASEAN, the issue-area of human 
rights, and by extrapolation human security in general, continues 
to come under the domineering purview of national governments. 
The ASEAN mechanism for human rights regime remains inchoate 
and non-functioning despite the stalwart efforts of the ASEAN 
working group on human rights. National human rights 
commissions that have been formed remain weak. On the regional 
plane in ASEAN, the engagement of civil society in human rights 
issues and matters, let alone participation in the implementation 
of human rights standards, remain low-level or non-existent. 
Much more occurs in civil society engagement with national 
human rights commissions although this is still one step removed 
from an actual engagement with the state or national governments 
as such.   
Apart from the above 'mainstream' forms of civil society 
engagement with the state, there is also the 'alternative' form 
represented by ALTSEAN-Burma. Some of the monitoring work is 
of great importance but remains outside the purview of ASEAN 
officialdom. 
It's still a long road to an ASEAN 'security community' from 
a civil society perspective whichever way one looks at it. Statist 
constructivism in ASEAN may have engendered the minimalist 
conditions for such a security community (most famously through 
the pacific settlement of conflict and the 'ASEAN way') but in so far 
as it fails to incorporate the involvement of civil society, which is 
                                                 
4 See ALTSEAN Report Card: "The Stakes are Raised in Burma", April 1999. 
Another Report Card: "The Situation of Women in Burma" was also produced in 
April 1999 for the same UN Human Rights Commission session.  
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the main constituency of human security, the project must falter.  
In fact, not only does the instrumental functioning of a security 
community depend on civil society but its very legitimacy rests             
on it. 
On a theoretical level, the hypothesized agency of the 
"international state" in Wendtian constructivism does not truly 
apply to the 'ASEAN state', which remains weak (and, in many 
portions, undemocratic) with processes and structures which tend 
not to deepen aspects of human security. Furthermore, the 
character of ASEAN diplomatic and security culture (the 'ASEAN 
way') tends at times to be an impediment rather than an enhancer 
or agency for human security.   
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